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Harriett: Torts: Last Clear Chance Doctrine in Florida

CASE COMMENTS
TORTS: LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
Connolly v. Steakley, 197 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1967)
Plaintiff, while crossing a street, was struck by defendant's automobile.
The Circuit Court for Sarasota County refused to give instructions on "last
clear chance." In affirming, the Second District Court of Appeal reasoned
that last clear chance operates against an inattentive defendant only when the
plaintiff is in a position of inextricable peril.1 The evidence revealed instead
that the plaintiff could have extricated herself had she discovered the peril,
but that her negligence continued up to the time of the collision. After issuing a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida decided it was improvidently issued, and by a per curiam decision HELD, that the writ should be
discharged. Justice O'Connell concurred specially with opinion. Justice
Drew dissenting.
Justice O'Connell conducts a comprehensive examination of the common
law doctrine of last clear chance and its proper application in Florida. His
conclusion that last clear chance does not apply to a situation where both the
plaintiff and defendant are merely inattentive should provide stability in this
rather agitated area of law, and also brings Florida in line with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions.2
The significance of this opinion, however, appears to be not so much an
illumination of the law of last dear chance, but a call by Justice O'Connell
for a retreat from the nuances of contributory negligence versus last clear
chance contests to a more equitable system of comparative negligence. It is
unfortunate that this pressing social need should be mentioned merely as an
afterthought to the opinion. Judicial reticence toward demanding legislation may have prompted this approach. Nevertheless, the underlying arguments supporting such a transition are sound and warrant reiteration. It is
hoped this comment can complement the opinion by demonstrating the merit
in changing to a comparative negligence system.
The confusion reflected in the instant case was generated by the supreme
court's earlier decision in James v. Keene.3 Sweeping language in that opinion
gave rise to speculation that Florida may have chosen to follow the so-called
"humanitarian doctrine," openly espoused in Missouri. 4 The humanitarian
doctrine theoretically enables an inattentive plaintiff to overcome the defense
of contributory negligence by proving that an inattentive defendant had the
last dear chance. 5 It is patently clear that the humanitarian doctrine cannot
be supported on traditional notions of last dear chance. When both parties
in an accident are inattentive, the plaintiff's negligence continues to the
1. Connolly v. Steakley, 165 So. 2d 784, 786 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

2. F. HmAPER &F.

JAmEs,

ToRTS 1252 (1956).

3. 133 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1961).
4. W. PROSSER, ToRTs 442 (3d ed. 1964).
5. See Womack v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S.W.2d 368 (1935).
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time of the accident. Thus, the defendant has no more last clear chance than
the plaintiff. In spite of this conceptual flaw, it may be asserted that adherence to the humanitarian approach promotes the last clear chance doctrine's accepted function of ameliorating the harsh all-or-nothing result of
contributory negligence. However, comments of jurists and scholars deprecating the utility of the humanitarian doctrine undermine the persuasiveness of this thesis, 6 for application of the humanitarian doctrine can
pervert this salutary function of last clear chance. This is accomplished when
last clear chance absolves the plaintiff from his negligence and shifts the entire loss to the defendant event though plaintiff's negligence may have been
greater. Hence, by attempting to relieve the plaintiff from the strictures of
contributory negligence the courts may, if the humanitarian doctrine is
operative, travel full circle and create an equally lamentable plight for the
defendant.
These comments correspond with Justice O'Connell's view that extension
of the last clear chance doctrine is not the solution to the dilemma in the
law caused by the outmoded defense of contributory negligence. Abandoning
contributory negligence and last clear chance concepts for a system of comparative negligence merits examination. Last clear chance doctrine need not
be tolerated as a step on the way to comparative negligence.7 There is a
paucity of evidence suggesting real correlation between the two doctrines.
Conversely, Dean Prosser's hypothesis that last clear chance is freezing any
transition, not accelerating it, seems more plausible. 8
Justice O'Connell has implored the legislature to "eradicate one of the
worst tangles known to the law." Adopting a comparative negligence system
would not be such a novel move by the legislature. A general comparative
negligence act was passed by the Florida Legislature in 1943, only to be vetoed
by the Governor. 10 Several states now employ comparative negligence schemes.
In 1910, Mississippi became the first state to adopt a general comparative
negligence act.11 Five other states have followed her lead. 2
Comparative negligence principles operate on the federal level. The
Federal Employer's Liability Act 13 protects railroad employees engaged in

interstate commerce. Under this act, the plaintiff's negligence will not bar
his recovery except to the extent he may be at fault. The Merchant Marine
6.

Dean Prosser indicates that great confusion and numerous appeals have attended the

application of the humanitarian doctrine, thereby foreshadowing the alleged practical benefit
of the doctrine. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 442. Chief Justice Ellison of the Missouri
Supreme Court dissented from the trend to expand the humanitarian doctrine because it
gave the defendant "no chance" rather than the "last clear chance." See Perkins v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 340 Mo. 868, 900, 102 S.W.2d 915, 932-33 (1937).
7. Contra, James, Last Clear Chance: A TransitionalDoctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
8. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 473 (1953).
9. 197 So. 2d at 537.
10. Fla. S. No. 247 Reg. Sess. (1943).
11. Laws of Miss. 1910, ch. 135, the current statute is Miss. CODE ANN. §1454 (1942).
12. ARK. STAT. ANN. §27-1730.2 (Supp. 1961); GA. CODE ANN. §94-703 (1936); NRa. REv.
STAT. §25-1151 (1943); S.D. CODE §47.0304-1 (Supp. 1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. §331.045 (1957).
13. 45 U.S.C. §51-59 (1958).
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Act- employs the same apportionment scheme with injuries to -maritime em15
ployees. Admiralty courts also apportion damages between negligent parties.
Another indication that comparative negligence is now considered to be
enlightened treatment in courts of common law tradition is the enactment
in Great Britain of the Law Reform Act of 1945,16 which abolished contributory negligence as a complete defense. Thus, the doctrine of contributory
negligence was disavowed in the jurisdiction of its birth. In adopting a comparative negligence system, Great Britain finally shifted to the approach that
long has served civil law jurisdictions satisfactorily.17
It is understandable why the aforementioned jurisdictions chose to substitute apportionment of damages for the all-or-nothing approach of contributory negligence. Legal scholars and sociologists have been advocating
such a change for decades.' 8 Their arguments are convincing. First, the historical reasons supporting contributory negligence no longer exist. The doctrine of contributory negligence developed during the industrial revolution
when struggling industries needed financial protection. Today, the economic
position of industry is more secure. Use of liability insurance is widespread
and helpful in distributing the industrial risks. Second, it is an open secret
that juries frequently ignore instructions on contributory negligence and
conduct their own makeshift apportionment through compromise verdicts. 19
Many jurists decry this situation for its destructive effect on citizens' respect for
the law.2 0 On a practical level one can object to the desultory treatment of
plaintiffs, which results from obvious lack of controls. One jury may be
disposed toward apportionment and compromise, where another one will not.
Finally, it is argued that a comparative negligence system well may relieve
docket congestion. 21 The argument runs that the chance of proving contributory negligence is a great impediment to settlement of negligent actions.
Why is such a system retained in the face of widespread denunciation? No
adequate reasons abound. One frequently stated objection to the suggested
change is lack of adequate standards to guide the jury in apportionment of
damages. 22 A simple illustration of how juries already apportion should help
assuage fear of capricious juries. Juries in Florida have apportioned the
damages among multiple offenders in nuisance cases since 1913.23 It may be
14. 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).
15. N.M. Paterson & Sons v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Inl. 1962).
16. 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28.
17. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 238 (1950).
18. See, e.g., Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law
Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958); Prosser, supra note 8; Turk, supra note 17.
19. Justice Holt described this phenomenon in Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202
finn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
20. See, e.g., Eldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Outmoded Defense That Should
be Abolished, 43 A.B.AJ. 52, 54 (1957).
21. See Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested
Courts, 19 ALBANY L. R. 4 (1955).
22. See, e.g., Burns, Comparative Negligence: A Law Professor Dissents, 51 ILL. B.J. 708,

713-15 (1963).
23. See Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn. 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913); Symmes v.
Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913).
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considered difficult to apportion certain elements of damages, such as mental
pain, among multiple tort-feasors but it is not an insuperable task.24 The
jury considers the best evidence available and usually is able to achieve
equitable results.
Dean Prosser suggests several factors conditioning legislatures' reluctance
to effect this change, including lobbying pressure from habitual defendants
such as liability insurance companies.25 Legislative inertia may be the more
controlling factor. If this is the reason, conditions in Florida should generate
the necessary impetus for overcoming this lag.
Traffic accidents increase significantly each year.2 6 Those injured in these
accidents, by reason of their incapacity, are least capable of bearing the loss
without severe hardship. A legal scholar in this state asserts that automobile
2
liability insurance is best suited to provide compensation to the injured. 7
The legislature already has given tacit recognition to the problem of uncompensated traffic victims by enacting the Financial Responsibility Act.28 The
purpose of this legislation is to ensure that a negligent motorist is able to
provide recompense to one injured as the result of his negligence. The truth
is that this purpose frequently is thwarted by the defense of contributory
negligence. Query: Why not require the defendant to account for his share
of the damage, instead of exonerating him?
The idea of apportioning damages is not alien to this jurisdiction. A
Florida statute 29 provides for apportionment of damages between employeremployees when injuries occure to employees working in certain hazardous
industries. Another statute 30 applies apportionment to all damages and injuries caused by a railroad, but it has been declared unconstitutional for its
discriminatory characteristic. 31 The attack on its constitutionality, however,
32
did not purport to contest the sagacity of a comparative negligence scheme.
Justice O'Connell reminds the legislature that a comparative negligence act
3
passed the legislature in 1943, but was aborted by the Governor's pen. 3
Conditions in 1943 suggested a change to comparative negligence. Docket
congestion and spiraling accident rates suggest that the situation has deteriorated since 1943. The legislature should heed the call of the Florida Supreme
Court.
GEORGE M. HARRIE-r, JR.

24.
25.

W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 248.
Id. at 445.

26.
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TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS IN FLORIDA (1964). In 1964, 186,180 persons were injured and 1,545
were killed in Florida traffic accidents. In 1966 these figures had jumped to 101,600 persons
injured and 1,819 killed.
27. Maloney, supra note 18, at 138.
28. FLA. STAT. §324.021 (1965).
29. FLA. STAT. §769.03 (1965). Included in the provisions of this statute are the following hazardous occupations: railroading, generating and selling electricity, telegraph
and telephone business, blasting and dynamiting, operating automobiles for public use,
boating when boat is propelled by steam, gas, or electricity.
30. FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1965).
31. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (1965).
32. Id.
33. 197 So. 2d at 537.
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